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Rocket

Identified CBRN agent

Chemical

Rocket event in Zamalka, Syrian Arab Republic on Wed 21st August 2013

21st August 2013

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Human Rights Watch documented the use of apparent surface-to-surface 330mm rockets in Zamalka, Eastern Ghouta on August 21. We found no evidence of any use of the 140mm rocket system used in the Moadamiya attack in Eastern Ghouta. Witness statements and information including GPS locations of rockets found in the area provided by local activists, as well as satellite imagery locations that match the location in the videos, have allowed Human Rights Watch to confirm at least four strike sites in Zamalka where at least eight 330mm rockets struck on August 21. This is unlikely to be a complete account of the number of rockets used in the attack. Two rockets struck al-Mahariq Street, one on the Ghazal building and the other on Mehyi al-Deen building; One rocket struck the Bostan neighborhood on Naher al-Tahoun street; Two rockets struck next to the Hamza mosque, one just next to the mosque and the other close to the nearby al-Kamal banquet hall; Three rockets struck the al-Mazraat neighborhood next to the al-Tawfiq mosque and next to the elementary school. None of the witness accounts describing the impact of the rockets, and none of the images of the rocket remnants or the reported injuries sustained at the scene are consistent with an attack using high explosive or incendiary payloads, as there are no visible traumatic injuries on any of the victims or large impact craters visible at the scene of the rocket impacts. High-explosive payloads would have caused severe physical injuries to the victims and leave large impact craters, while incendiary weapons cause severe burns on the victims, and leave behind a distinctive burn scar where they strike. Based on the lack of evidence of a high-explosive or incendiary attack, and symptoms of victims that are consistent with a chemical attack, Human Rights Watch believes that the 330mm rockets found at the sites were used in the alleged chemical attack. A member of the Zamalka media center told Human Rights Watch that he visited the scene of one strike in the al-Mazraat area of Zamalka just after the attack.

He said: On August 21, I was in the media office when around 2 to 3 a.m. my friends called to say that rockets had hit Zamalka. When I heard that, I went to the field hospital in al-Mazraat neighborhood… After around 30 minutes rockets hit the al-Mazraat area. When the explosion hit I heard a very low sound, it was like the sound of a helicopter buzzing, and not the sound of explosion… I went outside the field hospital and started running towards the explosion site. I didn’t reach the explosions site because I saw injured people on the ground and people screaming and running in all directions… I remember I went into one house and saw a man with his wife on the ground. The house was not destroyed. It was not where the rocket fell or had an impact but they were dead on the ground. After around 40 minutes rescuing people, I started feeling my body aching. I was feeling weak and unable to move. Then my eyes started hurting me and headache started. There was no smoke but there was a smell... I told my friend that I have to go to the hospital. He put me in a car and drove away… I remember very well when we left al-Mazraat in my friend’s car, I saw a dog crossing the street. I shouted to my friend to be careful not to hit him but before I finished my sentence the dog by itself collapsed on the ground. The same witness also confirmed to Human Rights Watch that he had videotaped and uploaded a large number of videos taken at the hospital of the wounded and dead.

A second witness shared with Human Rights Watch several videos of remnants of the weapons used in the al-Mazraat area on August 21.The videos show the same 330mm rocket type. The member of the Zamalka media center also shared with Human Rights Watch videos and pictures he took of rockets in the al-Mahariq strike site affected during the August 21 attack. The remnants in these videos are also 330mm rockets. On August 29 he visited the al-Mahariq strike site and photographed a 330mm rocket he found there and which he believes had been used during the August 21 attack. In the proceeding days, when the UN chemical weapons inspection team visited Zamalka, he took several videos of other 330mm rockets found at the al-Mahariq site, as they were being examined by the UN weapon inspectors. The 330mm surface-to-surface rocket that appears to be associated with the August 21 attack on Eastern Ghouta is of a type not listed in standard, specialized, international or declassified reference materials. It is a rocket type that has not been documented before the outbreak of the current Syrian conflict, although it has been documented in a number of other attacks on opposition held areas in the months prior to the Eastern Ghouta attack, including at least one attack in which opposition activists claimed the government had carried out an alleged chemical attack (see below).

Human Rights Watch has obtained precise measurements for the dimensions of the warhead from a local activist in Eastern Ghouta, and these measurements determine that the estimated volume of nerve agent inside the warheads would be approximately 50 to 60 liters, compared to 2.2 liters for the warheads designed for the 140mm rockets. Prior to each attack, the warhead of the 330mm rocket would have to be filled with the 50 to 60 liters of nerve agent, a dangerous process that is normally conducted by specialized teams wearing protective gear to prevent exposure to the chemical agents. Human Rights Watch is not aware of any information that the opposition forces have ever possessed the amounts of chemical weapon agent necessary to deploy such rockets, or that they possess the expertise needed to fill the warheads without accidental exposure to the deadly nerve agent.

Using the measurements and high-resolution images provided by the Eastern Ghouta activist, Human Rights Watch has been able to reconstruct the characteristics of the 330mm rocket. Detailed measurements and high-resolution photographs provided directly by an activist in Eastern Ghouta allowed Human Rights Watch to define the diameter of the rocket as approximately 330mm; this is significant because these dimensions are compatible with the Iranian-produced 333mm Falaq-2 launcher, or close copies and derivatives thereof.

Iran is believed to be the only country in the world to produce rocket launchers in the 333mm category. Videos have appeared showing Syrian forces using the Falaq-2 launching system to launch what appears to be versions of the 330mm rockets, although the launches seen in the video occurred during daytime and are thus unrelated to the August 21 nighttime attack. The rocket is of a non-aerodynamic design and possesses a novel spin stabilization mechanism located just above the nozzle. The non-aerodynamic design of the rocket indicates that the rocket would be relatively short ranged and not capable of accurate targeting. The consistency in the design of these rockets suggests that they were locally but industrially produced, and apparently designed to be deployed with the Iranian 333mm launchers or derivatives thereof.

While Human Rights Watch cannot establish where the rockets were manufactured, their basic design and unique size matching the Iranian rocket launching system suggest a Syrian industrial origin. The production of a weapon specifically designed to deliver chemical weapons would be a violation of the 1993 Convention on Chemical Weapons, of which only five countries, including Syria, are not parties. While a separate, high-explosive warhead version of the rocket appears to exist based on attacks in other areas, three design differences appear to distinguish the suspected chemical weapon type from the suspected high-explosive type: videos and photos of the weapons from attacks in Syria show that the chemical weapons variant has an additional plug or aperture on the payload (used to fill the container with chemical agent prior to firing); the high-explosive type measures at least 400mm longer; and the chemical weapons variant appears to be numbered in red numbers (with one documented rocket numbered 900, suggesting a significant number of the rockets were produced), while images of the high-explosive variant consistently show that it has black numbering, perhaps for ease of identification. All of the 330mm rocket remnants identified by Human Rights Watch in the Eastern Ghouta Zamalka attack are of the suspected chemical weapons variant, with red numbering, a shorter-sized warhead, and an additional fill plug. Most significantly, the design of the payload of the rockets found at the scene of the Eastern Ghouta August 21 attack strongly indicates that it is compatible, and perhaps specifically designed, for the delivery of chemical agents. The payload of the rocket consists of a large, thin-walled container, capable of holding 50 to 60 liters of chemical agent which is loaded into the payload via a plughole, and a small central tube with a suspected bursting charge at the front, rupturing the thin-walled container and distributing the vaporized chemical agent. The 330mm rocket has appeared in its high-explosive form in previous attacks around Damascus. The high-explosive version of the 330mm surface-to-surface rocket appears to have been used in the Daraya suburb of Damascus on January 4, 2013 and in Khalidiya, in Homs governorate, on August 2, 2013. Opposition forces blamed both attacks on the Syrian government, although Human Rights Watch could not independently confirm this allegation.

On August 5, 2013, opposition activists filmed what appears to be the remnants of the chemical weapons-carrying variant (with the extra fill plug visible as well as the red numbering system)[24] of the 330mm rocket in the `Adra suburb of Damascus, in what they alleged was a chemical weapons attack by Syrian government forces.

While Human Rights Watch could not independently confirm the allegations that Syrian government forces were responsible for the August 5 `Adra attack, the videos do show the remnants of suspected chemical weapons-delivery variant of the 330mm rocket, as well as dead and dying animals nearby, otherwise uninjured and showing signs of exposure to a nerve agent. No evidence has been produced that opposition forces are in possession of the 330mm surface-to-surface rockets and their associated launchers. The only documented attacks using this weapon system in Syria have been against opposition-held areas and targets. The Syrian government is known to possess the Iranian Falaq-2 333mm rocket launching system, as several videos have emerged on social media allegedly showing Syrian government forces firing the 330mm rockets from truck-mounted 333mm launchers, although no videos have emerged from the nighttime August 21 attack.

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Syrian Arab Republic (SYR)

Zamalka

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